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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/AppeHee,
v.
Case No. 20000209-SC
JORDAN CALUHAM,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant

ARGUMENTS

L
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION OF MISTI ERNST.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The State maintains that this Court should review the trial court's denial of the
psychiatric evaluation of Misti Ernst for an abuse of discretion. State's brief at 1, 20.
The State contends that this level of deference is appropriate given the delicacy and
intrusion involved when courts question a witness's sanity. State's brief at 20.
While Calliham agrees that all trial and appellate courts considering the
propriety of psychiatric evaluations of witnesses should act carefully to protect the
privacy interests of the witnesses, e.g., Stone v. Stone. 431 P.2d 802 (Utah 1967),
this consideration does not justify any added deference to the trial court's ruling,

which was based solely on his review of the preliminary hearing transcript (R. 84-86).
Because this Court routinely applies the law to transcripts,1 the Court is at least
in a position equal to that of the trial court on this issue in this particular case, and
should review the ruling for correctness. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 at 936,
939 (Utah 1994)(in discussing how standards of review are selected, the Court noted
that more deference is due when issues involve demeanor and credibility, because
the appellate record does not adequately convey these things).
B. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR ORDERING EVALUATIONS
The State and Calliham are in agreement on the relevant standard to justify
a psychiatric evaluation: Calliham was required to show that there was "a substantial
doubt that a witness is capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the
truth, or that he is able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with
reasonable accuracy." State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979). See, e.g.,
State's Brief at 21 ?

Cf., e.g., State v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278, 282 (Utah 1994). In selecting
standard of review for indigence determinations, the Court stated, TT]he m o r e the
application of a legal rule depends on facts that the trial judge is uniquely able to
evaluate, such as credibility, the less the likelihood that an appellate court can
effectively review the application of the law to those facts on a cold record."
2

The State questions the correctness of State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336, 1343
(Utah App. 1990), which indicates that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35 permits trial
courts to order mental examinations in criminal cases, because that rule governs
parties or persons "in the custody or legal control of a party." State's Brief at 16 n.5.
Given the State's ability to subpoena witnesses under U.R.Cr.P. 14 and Utah
Code Ann. § 77-22-1 et seq., and to prosecute for obstruction of justice pursuant to
2

The parties are also in agreement that the trial court's choice of State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT45, 979 P.2d 799, as the "most recent pronouncement of the Utah
Supreme Court in this area" was incorrect.3 Bakalov did not involve a court-ordered

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306, the State's witnesses are fairly characterized as being
in the State's control.
Particularly because Misti Ernst's plea bargain, reducing her murder charge
to a third degree felony attempted obstruction of justice with a prosecutorial
recommendation of probation including one year of jaii time, was premised on her
testimony (R. 49; P.H. 6-8), she was within the State's control.
3

The trial court ruled as follows:
The most recent pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court in
this area is State v. Bakalov. [1999 UT 45, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999),]
the primary prosecution witness suffered from disassociative identity
disorder ("DID"). Characteristics of DID include amnesia and memory
gaps. Competing multiple personalities, each with its own behavior
pattern and memories, compete for dominance within the patient. The
Supreme Court ruled that evidence of mental illness is material when
it may reasonably cast doubt on the witness' ability or willingness to tell
the truth. The court therefore decided that the prosecutor should have
disclosed the DID. However, since it was established after trial that the
witness' ability to recall the crime in question had not been affected by
her illness, the conviction was affirmed.
In this case, the only hint of mental illness is the adoption by the
witness of defense counsel's characterization of her dreams as
"hallucinations." There is no evidence of mental illness preceding the
crime. The transcript does not suggest to the court that Misty [sic]
suffers from mental illness. To the contrary, Misty [sic] appears capable
of distinguishing between what happened, what she dreamed, what she
worried about, what she told officers on different occasions, what she
wanted to say, what she heard from others, and what Jordan and his
brother might want her to say. If the court were to order a psychiatric
examination based on Misty's [sic] preliminary hearing testimony, an
examination would be required in virtually all cases.
Jordan's suggestion that a psychiatric examination might disclose
a propensity to lie runs up against the prohibition against using expert
witnesses as human lie detectors. Similarly, though Jordan is entitled

mental exam of a witness, but involved a prosecutor's failure to produce exculpatory
mental health records of its chief witness, and was thus inapposite to the issue
before the trial court, whether to order Misti Ernst to undergo an evaluation. See
State's Brief at 18.4
The State does not contest the other legal error in the trial court's ruling which
premised the denial of the evaluation in part on the trial court's erroneous view of the
scope of expert testimony in this context.5 While the Cailihams may not have been
entitled to call an expert witness on the issue of Misti's credibility under Utah Rule of
Evidence 608(a),6 expert witnesses may be used to inform the jury about a witness*
to introduce reputation testimony about Misti's credibility, he is probably
not entitled to attack her credibility with an expert psychiatric witness
unless a mental illness has been established. Absent evidence of
actual mental illness, the court will not order an examination to fish for
it.

The motion is denied.
(R. 84-86).
4

The fact that the trial court's ruling did not apply the correct standard is
perhaps the best reason to review his ruling without deference.
5

The trial court ruled as follows:
Jordan's suggestion that a psychiatric examination might disclose
a propensity to lie runs up against the prohibition against using expert
witnesses as human lie detectors. Similarly, though Jordan is entitled
to introduce reputation testimony about Misti's credibility, he is probably
not entitled to attack her credibility with an expert psychiatric witness
unless a mental illness has been established.
See R. 84-86.
6

Rule 608 provides as follows:
4

cognitive functioning and abilities, and as long as the experts do not give direct
subjective opinions about witness credibility, the fact that jurors may draw adverse
inferences about witness credibility from the expert testimony does not render the
expert testimony inadmissible under the rule. See, e.g., State v. Adams. 2000 UT
42 , 5 P.3d 642, 645-46.7

(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to
credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced.
7

In Adams, this Court affirmed the Utah Court of Appeals' anaiysis condoning
an expert's testifying about whether a child sexual abuse victim was capable of
creating the allegations, or of repeating the allegations introduced to her by a third
person, because the expert did not specifically offer an opinion as to her credibility,
but merely provided facts from which the jury might have drawn positive inferences
about her credibility.
5

C. APPLYING THE LAW
The disputed issue before the Court is whether, in applying the correct
Hubbard standard, the preliminary hearing transcript establishes "a substantial doubt
that [Misti Ernst was] capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the
truth, or that [she was] able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with
reasonable accuracy." State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979).
The State does not contest that the preliminary hearing transcript includes
statements reflecting Misti's inability to distinguish truth from falsehood, and to follow
the oath she took as a witness.8
The State defends the trial court's ruling that Ms. Ernst did not truly hallucinate
about the subject matter of her testimony, but only adopted defense counsel's term
"hallucinations" in describing her "dreams," "nightmares," and "inevitable images and
thoughts conjured up in Misti's mind from reliving and imagining the events of that
evening." State's brief at 24.
Assuming that this Court agrees that reference to the DSM-IV-R and the

s

For instance, at the preliminary hearing, when Mr. Schultz asked Misti why she
was changing her story, she explained that her lawyer told her she had to tell the
complete truth with exact detail (P.H. at 52). She maintained that she had been
telling the truth before the recess, but just did not tell every little thing she knew (P.H.
at 52).
A review of her preliminary hearing testimony, in Part II of the Statement of
Facts, supra at *, confirms that Ernst was not omitting details, but was lying in at
least one of her differing versions of events relayed at the preliminary hearing.
6

Department of Justice websites was improper,9 the State does not object to
Calliham's reference to Black's Law Dictionary, which defines halludnation as
follows:
Hallucination
/hJ(y) uwsan-eyshan/. An apparently real sensory
perception (auditory or visual) without any real external stimuli to cause
it; commonly experienced by psychotics. It may occur with relation to
any of the special senses, e.g. hearing sounds or seeing things that do
not exist. The perception by any of the senses of an object which has
no existence. The conscious recognition of a sensation of sight,
hearing, feeling, taste, or smell which is not due to any impulse
received by the perceptive apparatus from without, but arises within the
perceptive apparatus itself.
9

Calliham disagrees that his reliance on these reference materials amounts to
improperly inserting evidence in his brief. But see State's Brief at 25. On appeal, it
is appropriate to research and cite to such reference materials in order to inform the
Court of technical issues which require eluddation. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 24
(a)(3) (recognizing that parties may cite other authorities in addition to cases,
statutes, rules and constitutional provisions).
This Court often refers to such reference materials in published opinions. See,
e.g., Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 858 P.2d 970, 975 and n.5 (Utah
1993)(referring to the DSM-III in the course of observing, "Given recent medical
advances in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, it is now possible to establish
emotional illness with some degree of certainty."); State v. Boyd. 2001 UT 30 1f 18
and n.2, 25 P.3d 985, 991 (in addressing absence of court reporter in rape trial, this
Court quoted from a website, stating "'Computer integrated courtrooms enable court
reporters to "create . . . records through computer-aided transcription . . . that are
instantaneously sent to computers at the judge's bench, on the attorney's tables, and
[at] other strategic courtroom locations."^.
None of the cases cited by the State on the issue of striking improper matters
from the brief involved similar reliance on reference materials. See State v. PHeoo.
1999 UT 8, % 7, 974 P.2d 279 (appellant improperly included evidentiary documents
in his brief); Wilderness Blda. Svs. Inc. v. Chapman. 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah
1985)(parties did not order transcripts and trial exhibits were the only evidence
before the Court, the Court noted that it would dedde the case on the basis of the
record before the Court); In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 862 (Utah 1996)(discussing
what must be induded in the record on appeal from Judidal Conduct Commission).
7

This definition describes the experiences attested to by Ernst, and confirms
that her preliminary hearing testimony raised "a substantial doubt that [Misti Ernst
was] capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the truth, or that [she
was] able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with reasonable accuracy."
State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979).
Regardless of which label is used to refer to the phenomena experienced by
Misti Ernst, the record clearly demonstrates that Misti could not distinguish between
reality and the phenomena {P.H. at 59-62). The record also demonstrates that Misti
had dreamed or hallucinated repeatedly about Eaton seeing her and talking to her
after his death and about being at the scene of his death, but did not initially realize
that her hallucinations or dreams were hallucinations or dreams, and had told the
police her hallucinations or dreams before she recognized them as such, and also
told them hearsay from third parties and lies without identifying her statements to
them as such (P.H. at 57, 59-61).
The preliminary hearing transcript demonstrates that Misti was constructing
her versions of the events at the preliminary hearing

by reviewing these

hallucination and hearsay-filled statements to the police.10
10

Misti testified that the changes in her testimony at the preliminary hearing
stemmed from having watched her taped statements to the police during the recess,
which refreshed her recollection and supplemented what independent recall she had
(P.H. at 91-92).
The prosecutor corrected the record, indicating that she had listened to an
audiotape, but did not see a videotape (P.H. at 93).
8

The record also demonstrates that this unusual construction of testimony
continued at trial. At trial, she testified that she had done substantial preparation for
her trial testimony, and had determined the true events by reviewing her prior
statements to the police (R. 374 at 90)."
The State does not address or contest Calliham's contention that Misti Ernst
should not have testified because her testimony was fundamentally unreliable as a
result of her unique memory reconstruction process. See State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d
1203 (Utah), cert, denied. 494 U.S. 1018 (1990);12 State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116
(Utah 1989);13 Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT61, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999).14
She then explained that she had been trying to black the events out, but knew
what happened once she heard her story on the tape with the police (P.H. at 94).
a
At trial, she testified that she had done substantial preparation for her trial testimony,
and had determined the true events by reviewing her prior statements to the police
(R. 374 at 90).
Likewise, at the preliminary hearing, Misti testified that the changes in her
testimony stemmed from having watched her taped statements to the police during
the recess, which refreshed her recollection and supplemented what independent
recall she had (P.H. at 91-92).
The prosecutor corrected the record, indicating that she had listened to an
audiotape, but did not see a videotape {P.H. at 93).
She then explained that she had been trying to black the events out, but knew
what happened once she heard her story on the tape with the police (P.H. at 94).
12

In Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah), the Court found that a witness could not testify
because the witness had undergone hypnotic therapy to enhance memories of the
crime. The Court characterized the testimony as "the product of scientific
intervention^" and inadmissible in the absence of foundation to prove the reliability
of hypnotic memory enhancement, id- at 1211.
13

In Mitchell, the Court overruled the trial court's admission of hypnotically

9

While the State faults Calliham for referring to the DSM-iV-R and Department
of Justice websites, and in failing to introduce "expert testimony explaining what
hallucinations are, the possibility that someone like Misty could be suffering from
them, or the effect they might have on a person's ability to remember and relate
events," State's Brief at 24-25, the shortcomings in the record are attributable to the
trial court's refusal to order a mental examination of Ernst, for Calliham, an indigent
criminal defendant.
Even if Calliham were not indigent, and had funds to procure his own expert,
courts routinely recognize the low probative value and speculative nature of
testimony of mental health experts who testify about subjects they have not
examined. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Felix. 569 F.2d 1274, 1282 (3 fd
Cir. 1978).15

enhanced testimony, finding that the testimony was inherently unreliable. ]d. at

1119.
14

In Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT 61, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999), the plaintiff
sued the defendant for alleged sexual abuse. The plaintiff had undergone many
sessions of therapy, wherein the therapist used various relaxation techniques to
evoke the memories which formed the basis of the civil suit. This Court found that
the plaintiff's "recovered memories" were the product of "scientific intervention,'' and
held that because the recovery methods employed by the therapist were unreliable,
the plaintiffs testimony was tainted and inadmissible. 1999 UT 61 at fflf 19 and 20,
987 P.2d at 28-29.
15

In Felix, the Third Circuit Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion for
mental examination of defendant, which was based on affidavit of defense counsel.
The court explained,
The fundamental weakness of the affidavit is that it does not point to
10

The State discusses evidence from the preliminary hearing corroborating Misti
Ernst's testimony in an effort to uphold the trial court's ruling. State's Brief at 32-33.
Just as the absence of corroborating evidence does not call for a mental evaluation
of a witness, the presence of corroborating evidence has little direct bearing on the
individual assessment required by Hubbard, whether there is "a substantial doubt
that a witness is capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the truth,
or that he is able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with reasonable
accuracy." State v. Hubbard. 601 P.2d 929, 930 (Utah 1979).
The State has presented no case law indicating that consideration of
corroborating evidence is appropriate in assessing whether or not to order a mental
evaluation of a witness, and given that most mental evaluations will be sought prior
to trial, trial courts will rarely have a firm grasp on whether there is evidence to
corroborate a witness's testimony.
At the time of the preliminary hearing in this case, there was no need for the

any specific evidence of mentaf incapacity or illness. It recounts in a
summary fashion, inter alia, the defendant's criminal record, his history
of disciplinary difficulties as a Corrections Officer with the Department
of Public Safety, his appearance of excitation in conferences with
counsel, his "obsession" with Gary Gilmore, the convicted killer in Utah
who sought his own electrocution, the apparent opinion of a psychiatrist
(who did not examine Felix) that the killing of Industrious might have
been caused by mental illness, and the embarrassment of counsel
when his client engaged in a lengthy "diatribe" in court during the
sentencing proceedings. None of these points involves definite medical
orpsychiatnc testimony from one who is professionally qualified to pass
judgment on the matter in question, and who personally examined the
defendant,
\ti. (emphasis added).
11

defense to challenge whether there was evidence to corroborate Misti Ernst's
testimony, because the standard for a bindover in criminal cases is so low. See,
e.g., State v. Talbot. 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)(at preliminary hearing,
magistrate must view ail evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the
prosecution).
To the degree that this corroborative analysis is appropriate, Calliham refers
the Court to his opening brief statement of facts, which discusses the physical
evidence and investigation and evidence contradicting and corroborating Misti
Ernst's pivotal testimony in detail. In short, her testimony was key to the conviction,
and yet largely uncorroborated and contradicted.
D. PRESERVATION OF THE CONFRONTATION ISSUE
The State argues that constitutional confrontation claim was waived because
it was not presented to the trial court. State's Brief at 34.
While parties certainly do have a duty to object to procedures in the trial
courts, this Court often addresses constitutional issues on appeal, in the absence of
specific mention of constitutional implications in the trial court. For instance, in State
v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 957 (Utah App. 1993), the court of appeals expressly
found that trial counsel preserved the constitutional confrontation issues involved
when a co-participant in the defendant5s crime took the stand, but refused to answer
a series of leading questions by the prosecutor, id. And on certiorari in State v.
ViHarreal. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995), this Court noted that this process occurred over
12

the objection of the defendant, and then fully addressed the violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation involved in this testimony, and found
that these constitutional errors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ]d. at
422-426. By examining the second volume of the transcript in Villarreal. this Court
can confirm that trial counsel there did not raise the confrontation issue, but
repeatedly objected to the procedure in the trial court.16
The State argues that Calliham did not argue plain error or exceptional
circumstances. State's brief at 34.
Actually, the first footnote of Calliham's opening brief correctly argued plain
error, stating,
To the extent that any issue raised herein was not properly preserved
at trial, Calliham relies on the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrines to raise the issues on appeal.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although
the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error
occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial
court. £§e_, e ^ , State v. Eldredqe. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), figrL
denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the
plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138,1140
(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 145 LEd.2d 343 (1999).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Calliham must
demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable
16

Villarreal's trial counsel objected to the leading nature of the questions, to the
presentation of hearsay, to the prosecutor's presentation of a story through
questioning when the prosecutor had no evidence to support the story, to the lack
of foundation to support the questioning, and to the danger of confusing the jury with
the questioning (T.2 at 218-223).
13

standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient performance
was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), certdenied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance
of counsel doctrine requires proof of a reasonable probability of a different
result in the absence of the objectively deficient performance. See e ^ State
v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988).
Applying the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines here,
when the trial court was faced with a motion for a psychiatric evaluation of Misti
Ernst, the memorandum explaining the need for the evaluation (R. 56-61), and the
preliminary hearing transcript, it should have been obvious to the trial court and
counsel that the denial of the evaluation would substantially hamper Calliham's
ability to confront Misti and to present his defense.]!

17

The law explaining the constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a
defense is basic and was well established at the time of the trial court's ruling, testify
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witness against him[.]
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against
him [.]
See also Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 (Utah due process provision); United
States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 (federal due process provision); Utah Code
Ann. § 77-1-6(providing parallel statutory protections); Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308
(1974)(Court found that the defendant was entitled to cross-examine the state's
witness regarding his bias stemming from pressures he faced as a juvenile
probationer, despite the traditional privacy and confidentiality afforded to juvenile
records); Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1985)("Whether rooted directly in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi.
[410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)], or in the Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses
of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); Davis v.
14

The prejudice caused by the error in denying the evaluation is fully addressed
in Point I subpoint E of Calliham's opening brief.
E. REVERSIBLE NATURE OF THE ERROR
The State makes no claim of harmless error.
Whether this Court recognizes the constitutional nature of the error and
requires the government to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or
whether the Court considers the error to be non-constitutional, requiring Calliham to
prove the harmfulness of the error, the error was reversible. See Opening Brief of
Appellant, Point I, subpoint E.

iL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SEVERANCE.
A. PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
The State argues that because counsel for Jordan conceded that Jordan had
Alaska. 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' California v. Trombetta. 467
U.S. at 465; cf Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 684-685 (1984) ('The
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines
the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment'). We break no new ground in observing that an essential component
of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948); Grannis v. Ordean. 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)."); Christiansen v. Harris. 163
P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945)(an essential of due process provided by article I section
7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to submit evidence."); State v.
Harding. 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981)("[T3he defendant's right to present all
competent evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed by the due process clause
of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.J"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (providing
parallel statutory protection).
15

no basis for seeking a severance, and because counsel for Jordan did not join in the
motion for a mistrial made by counsel for Terril after Misti Ernst relayed hearsay in
violation of a prior court order, Jordan did not provide the trial court with an
opportunity to correct the error, and has waived issues related to the severance.
State's Brief at 35-36.
The purpose of the waiver doctrine is to insure that trial courts have the first
opportunity to correct errors prior to appeals, to conserve judicial resources which
would otherwise be expended in the event of a new trial. See, e.g., State v.'
McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 947 {Utah 1982).
The fact that counsel for Jordan conceded prior to trial that he had no basis
for a severance does not translate into waiver of all issues, particularly in light of
Jordan's counsel's repeated objections to the trial court's later rulings that the
witnesses should be required to testify inaccurately, and that counsel for Jordan
could not cross-examine them fully

(R. 374 at 116, 120, 121, 178). These

objections certainly gave the trial court the opportunity to avoid these specific errors.
Whether or not counsel for Jordan expressly joined in the mistrial motion
relating to Misti Ernst's testimony, the trial court ruled on the merits of that issue, and
discussed its rationale for why neither defendant was prejudiced by its designed
course of action (R. 374 at 116-117).
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d) empowers trial courts to relieve parties
of waiver of issues and rule on the merits. See id. {"Failure of the defendant to timely
16

raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for good
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.").
This Court recognizes that under this rule, if a trial court rules on an issue and
ignores apparent waiver of the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal. See, State
v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048,1052-53 (Utah 1991)(triaJ court chose to ignore waiver
of objection to admission of evidence and ruled on the merits, therefore the issue
was preserved for appeal). Trial courts need not make findings of good cause
before relieving parties of the effects of waiver. See. State v. Belgard. 830 P.2d
264, 265-66 (Utah 1992)(when trial court held evidentiary hearing post-trial and ruled
on the merits, issue regarding admissibility of evidence was preserved for appeal,
despite the fact that the trial court did not make afindingof good cause).
In the circumstances of this case, wherein the trial court considered the
positions of both defendants in denying the motion for a mistrial, and the options
open to him to provide a severance, separate juries or redaction (R. 374 at 116-117),
the issue is preserved. See, e.g., Matsamas. supra.
B. MERITS OF THE ISSUE
Jordan does not claim a Bruton violation by virtue of the admission of his own
statements. See State's Brief at 37.
Rather, he claims that when the trial court ordered that the jaiihouse
informants testify inaccurately to make it appear that Jordan was the person solely
17

responsible for Eaton's murder, and forbade counsel for Jordan from crossexamining them fully (R. 374 at 113-121,171-174; R. 314 at 115-,), this resulted in
a due process violation18 and a confrontation violation.19
18

See, e.g.. Walker v. State. 624 P.2d 687, 690-91 (Utah 1981 )("lt is an accepted
premise in American jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the knowing use
of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with 'rudimentary
demands of justice.' The proposition is firmly established that a conviction obtained
through the use of false evidence known to be such by representatives of the State,
must fail under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
Section 7, of the Utah State Constitution, if there is any reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. The same result
obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears. This standard derives from both the prosecutorial
misconduct and more importantly the fact that the use of false evidence involves a
corruption of the truth seeking function of the trial process.'')(footnotes omitted);
State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984){"lt is undisputed that a criminal
conviction procured by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair
and violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Art. 1, §
7 of the Utah State Constitution. The conviction must be vacated if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury. ")(footnotes omitted).
19

It is fundamental that to ensure accuracy and reliability, testimony
should be given under oath in open court with the opportunity for crossexamination. State v. Sanders. 27 Utah 2d 354, 359, 496 P.2d 270,
273 (1972). Although the confrontation clauses of the state and federal
constitutions protect similar values, those clauses are not coterminous
with the hearsay rule and its exceptions. See Idaho v. Wright. 497 U.S.
805, 814, 111 L Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990); California v.
Green. 399 U.S. 149, 155-56, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct 1930 (1970);
State v. Lenaburg. 781 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). As a general
proposition, exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate the
confrontation clause. On the other hand, the right of a defendant to
confront an accuser may bar evidence that might otherwise be
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Wright. 497 U.S. at
814: see Green. 399 U.S. at 155-56.
State v. ViHarreal. 889 P.2d 419, 424 (Utah 1995).
18

The State argues that if there had been a separate trial, Jordan's statements
would have been admitted without redactions, as confessions. State's Brief at A2
through 43.
In assessing this argument, this Court should bear in mind that Jordan's
statements ail came from jailhouse informants who, as a class, are biased by a need
to curry favor with the State, and are thus notoriously unreliable.20

Had the

witnesses been permitted to testify truthfully, and had defense counsel been given
authority to fully cross-examine these witnesses, there is no telling what they might
have said, or what a jury might have thought of their testimony.21 Compare State
v. Telford. 940 P.2d 522, 526 (Utah 1997)(defendant's redacted statement was
made to and relayed to the jury by a police officer).
The State argues that this Court should not base a reversal on state
constitutional grounds in this case, because the state constitutional briefing is

20

See, e.g., Crowe v. State. 441 P.2d 90, 95-96 (Nev. 1968)(
"[RJecognizing that the use of informers is a dirty tactic for a dirty business that
may raise serious questions of credibility, we think the defendant is entitled to
considerable latitude to probe credibility by cross-examination and to have the
issue submitted to the jury with careful instructions cautioning them of the care
which must be taken in weighing such testimony. On Lee v. United States. [343
U.S. 747 (1952)].").
21

Because the informants' statements were not tape or audio-recorded, there
is no guarantee as to what they truly said. One of the jail informants testified that
the police report was inaccurate in recording his version of Jordan's admissions (R.
374 at 195-96).
19

inadequate. State's Brief at 43 n.2, citing State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 873 n.6
(Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993).
In Seale. the Appellant provided no separate argument or analysis to justify
a state constitutional ruling. See id.
In contrast, Cailiham has thoroughly reviewed the relevant federal law and
provided this Court with this object lesson in why the federal law is unacceptable the redaction method of dealing with co-defendant's confessions risks or results in
judicial evidence tampering and perjury. This Court has previously adopted a state
constitutional argument with less briefing than this,22 and can rightly do so when
there is a logical need for the ruling and the state constitutional provisions and law
are consonant with the ruling.
C. REVERSIBLE NATURE OF THE ERROR
The State does not claim that the error was harmless, or attempt to show it
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as it must with constitutional errors, see,
Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
Cailiham maintains that the errors involved in the jaiihouse informant
testimony were harmful, even under a non-constitutional standard. See Opening

22

See State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81, 84 and n.3 (Utah 1997)(adopting
State's argument that effect of prayer on juror deliberations cannot be considered
in juror affidavit, because this might impinge on the jurors' state constitutional
right under Article I § 4 to serve without a religious test). See generally Appellee's
brief in DeMille. case number 860532 (containing very little state constitutional
analysis).
20

Brief of Appellant at Point II subpoint B.

JIL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING GORY PHOTOGRAPHS OF EATON'S CORPSE.
The parties are in agreement as to the governing law on gruesome
photographs, see, e ^ , State's Brief at 43-46.
It is for this Court to now view the evidence and determine whether the
admission of the photographs can be affirmed under the relevant law.
Calliham maintains all positions set forth in the opening brief regarding the
inadmissibility of the photographs, which refute the majority of the State's arguments
without further elaboration. See Opening Brief of Appellant at Point III.
The State devotes over twelve pages of its brief to its argument that the Court
should overrule the Cloud line of cases recognizing that certain types of evidence are
presumptively prejudicial under rule 403. State's Brief at 120-132.
This Court should reject this argument because the Cloud line of cases is well
reasoned and persuasive, and serves the vital goal of insuring the reliability of the
proceedings by protecting jurors from evidence which has no special probative value
to the issues they must determine, but which carries a powerful tendency to arouse
juror emotions to the degree that the legitimate deliberative process is overridden.
See, generally, e.g., State v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986).
While the State's nose count of other jurisdictions may leave this Court in a
distinctive position of requiring the lower courts to insure the reliability of the
21

deliberative process in cases wherein these highly prejudicial types of evidence are
available, this Court is not bound to follow lockstep in the footsteps of other courts.
The Cloud line of cases is well-established and well known to the bench and
bar in this state, and deliberations in Utah are more reliable as a result of this
jurisprudence.

The Cloud line of cases is but one example of unique Utah

jurisprudence requiring trial courts to safeguard the legitimacy of trials by rigorously
screening questionable evidence.23

23

This Court has interpreted Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, the due
process provision, as requiring exclusion of unreliable eyewitness identification
evidence which is likely to be unduly impressive to jurors in State v. Ramirez. 817
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). This provision of the State constitution requires an inquiry into
the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see generally Christiansen v. Harris. 163
P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945), and supports this Court's decision in Cloud, which seeks
to shield jurors from evidence with a high propensity to skew the deliberative process
away from the merits of the case, based on the emotional reactions of the jurors to
the evidence.
This Court likewise sets uniquely high state standards for the admission of
expert testimony, requiring that trial courts verify the validity of expert testimony
before jurors are exposed to such influential evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.7 and 400 (Utah 1989)(in assessing admissibility
of scientific evidence, trial court is to determine if techniques and principles
underlying expert testimony are inherently reliable, if the techniques and principles
have been property applied, and if the evidence is admissible under rule 403); State
v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996)(maintaining Rimmasch standard, despite
United States Supreme Court's less rigorous interpretation of the parallel and
verbatim ruie of evidence 702).
22

THE TRIAL COURTS REMOVAL OF QUALIFIED JURORS
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Because the parties have provided this Court with the voir dire of prospective
jurors Reiily and Steele, this Court may now proceed to determine whether the trial
court acted correctly in removing Juror Reiily for cause on his own motion and over
the objection of the defense after offering to keep her on if the prosecutor wanted her
on the pane! (R. 400 at 182), see generally, State v. Sevboldt. 236 P. 225 (Utah
1925); and whether the court acted beyond the limits of reasonability in granting the
prosecutor's challenge for cause of Juror Steele over the objection of the defense,
see State v. Archuletta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979
(1993).
The Court should not grant trial courts broad discretion in removing jurors for
cause on their own motion, Seybold. because unchecked discretion to remove jurors
by the trial courts is inconsistent with the policy of Utah law to extend the opportunity
of jury service to ail citizens equally,24 and inconsistent with the plain language of
""Utah Code Ann. §78-46-2 states,
it is the policy of this state that persons selected for jury service be
selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the
county, and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity in
accordance with this chapter to be considered for service and have
the obligation to serve when summoned for that purpose.
See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 ("A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt
23

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, which grants the right to make for-cause
challenges to the parties, not the court.25
B. PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE
The State contends that this Court should not adopt a presumption of prejudice
when a trial court improperiy grants for-cause challenges, and argues as a policy,
matter that such a presumption would run contrary to this Court's admonitions to trial
courts to grant questionable for-cause challenges. State's Brief at 80-81.
The State's argument that the expedient of "err[ing] on the side of caution in
ruling on for-cause challenges" "applies to prospective jurors of questionable bias for
either the defendant or the prosecution" is lacking supporting authority. State's Brief
at 80.
The policy of erring on the side of caution actually serves the interest in
conservation of judicial resources which are expended in the event of a retrial
required by unnecessary errors at trial, a concern which does not arise when the
jurors left on the panel appear to be biased for the defense or against the

from jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
occupation, disability, or economic status.").
25

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 (c)(2) currently extends the right to make forcause challenges to the prosecution and the defense, not the court. See id. (... "All
challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the
defense."). This rule is sensible, given that trial courts are often not in a position to
anticipate the issues which will arise at trial, and are best suited to impartially
resolving challenges for cause by the parties most familiar with the case.
24

prosecution in criminal cases, because the prosecution generally cannot appeal from
an acquittal or conviction.
Particularly in this case, wherein the trial court did not just grant a for-cause
challenge, but removed a juror sua sponte over defense objection and with
prosecutorial veto power, the State's concern about "flying in the face" of the
cautious granting of for-cause challenges, State's Brief at 81, is misplaced.26
The presumption of prejudice sought by Calliham is not the wholesale
automatic reversal rule discussed in the State's Brief at 79 and 80. Rather, he
seeks a presumption of prejudice only in cases wherein the trial court's rulings
effectively grant the prosecution substantially more peremptory challenges than the
defense, and thus give the prosecution an unfair advantage in shaping the jury. See
Randle v. Alien. 862 P.2d 1329, 1333-1334 (Utah 1993)(applying this presumption
in civil context); Carrier v. ProTech. 944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997).
The State does not contest the Court's observation in these cases that when
26

The State seeks to mollify the fact that the trial court gave the prosecutor the option
of keeping Reilly on the panel by citing to State v. Litheriand. 2000 UT 76, §§ 21, 23,
31, 12 P.3d 92, for this proposition: "If a party chooses to retain a prospective
jurorfor whom [it] arguably possessed a suffident basis to challenge for cause,' the
trial court does not act unreasonably in respecting that parties' decision." State's
Brief at 77.
Litheriand involves a claim of ineffective assistance of defense counsel at trial
for failing to challenge jurors for cause, and discusses the Strickland presumptions
in that unique context that defense counsel abstained from challenging the jurors as
a matter of choice, and that this choice constituted effective representation. See id.
Litheriand does not stand for the proposition that a trial court may cede its authority
to rule on challenges for cause or to remove jurors for cause to the prosecution.
25

one side has substantially more peremptory challenges than the other, this gives the
side with more peremptory challenges an upper hand in shaping the jury.
Nor does the State contest the fundamental constitutional law guarantying that
defendants be treated with fairness, impartiality and uniformity.27
The State's argument that the number of peremptories was equal for the
prosecution and defense in this case overlooks the fact that the trial court recognized
at the outset that the Callihams should have more peremptory challenges than the
prosecution, by originally granting the two defendants five peremptory challenges to
exercise jointly and one challenge each to exercise independently, and gave the
prosecutor five challenges (R. 400 at 265).
This original ruling was consistent with subsection (d) of rule 18, which grants
trial courts discretion to grant jointly tried criminal defendants additional peremptory
challenges, and consistent with the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, given
the disparate defenses and positions of the Callihams.28 Effectively granting the

27

Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, and § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution both guarantee due process of law. These provisions require trial
courts to act fairly and impartially in civil and criminal cases. See Anderson v. Industrial
Commission of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.") (citation omitted); State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992
P.2d 951, 961 (impartial judge is essential to a fair trial).
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees equal protection of the laws, and Articie I § 24 of the Utah Constitution requires
uniform operation of the laws.
28

Terrii raised an alibi defense, while Jordan relied on reasonable doubt. Terrii
had to match his alibi evidence against conflicting evidence by the state, while
26

prosecution the same number of peremptory challenges as these two defendants
were required to share was inconsistent with recognized principles of equal
protection and uniform operation of the laws. Qf. Carrier v. Pro Tech. 944 P.2d 346,
354 (Utah 1997); Randle at 1333-34.
Given the unique and life altering difference one juror can make in a criminal
case, the rationale behind presumption of prejudice recognized in the civil arena
applies with much greater force in the criminal context, and the presumption should
as well. See Randle and Carrier, supra.
C. ACTUAL PREJUDICE UNDER SEYBOLD
In the event that prejudice is not presumed, it is established under Seyboldt.
because Reilly and Steele were so acutely aware of their responsibilities as jurors.
See Opening Brief of Appellant, Point IV, subpoints A and B. Qf. Seybold. 236 P.
225, 228-30 (finding trial court's erroneous sua sponte for-cause removal of a juror
harmless, because cursory voir dire of juror did not display anything particularly
valuable about that juror).
In light of the foregoing, the trial court's removal of Reilly and Steele without
cause were prejudicial errors requiring a new trial.

Jordan had to contend with his alleged admissions to jailhouse informants.
Opening Brief of Appellant, Statement of Facts.
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See

CONCLUSION
Individually, and cumulatively, the errors discussed above warrant a new
trial.
DATED this 20th day of August, 2001.
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